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Abstract. Human interaction has a distinct collaborative quality based
on the attribution of communicative intentionality. Two networks in the
human brain are often described as part of the “social brain”: the mirror
system for recognizing intentional behavior and the mentalizing (theory
of mind) system for processing it. We equip virtual agents with both sys-
tems and model their interaction during embodied communication. Re-
sults of simulation experiments demonstrate how higher orders of theory
of mind lead to more robustness of communication by enabling interac-
tive grounding processes.
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1 Introduction
Building artificial agents for natural interaction with humans eventually re-
quires a deep understanding of the mechanisms underlying human social be-
havior. We are particularly interested in the perceptual and cognitive mecha-
nisms that shape human behavior in social interaction. Those mechanisms have
been receiving growing interest in fields such as Cognitive Science and Cognitive
Neuroscience in the last decade. Two partially overlapping networks have been
identified in the “social brain” [17]: an action observation system for perceiving
and recognizing others’ behaviors, and a mentalizing system for understanding
others in terms of attributed mental states or theory of mind (ToM). Action
observation is widely assumed to rest upon principles of prediction-based pro-
cessing [2], where predictions about expected sensory stimuli are continuously
formed and evaluated against incoming sensory input to inform further process-
ing. A core mechanism to derive such predictions are sensorimotor simulations of
the observed behavior, also referred to as mirroring. Prediction-based processing
has also been argued to underlie language production and comprehension [9] or
the social brain more generally [5].
We argue that learning from these mechanisms may help to substantially im-
prove the interactive capabilities of virtual agents. Furthermore, developing mod-
els and testing them in human-agent interaction contributes to a more detailed
understanding of how the social brain works. For example, it is not clear so far
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how the mentalizing system and the mirroring system work together: How does
perception change when a behavior is assumed to be “for me”? How are pathways
between perception and action modulated by mentalizing in social interaction?
And how do these mechanisms participate in coordination processes like feed-
back, joint attention, or grounding? Indeed, interacting with agents assumed to
be “intentional” is fundamentally different from interacting with non-intentional
objects [6]. For example, it has been shown that intentionality-attribution and
underlying mentalizing influence sensory processing to become “social percep-
tion”, an altered understanding of each other’s actions [19, 14], which is also
known as an “intentional stance” [4]. Clearly, these processes play an important
role not only in solitary observation events, in which they have been studied
mostly so far, but even more so in continuous online interaction [8, 13].
In this paper, we present work towards virtual agents with social brain-like
functions by realizing and integrating mirroring and mentalizing abilities in a
cognitively inspired fashion. In the following sections, we first review related
modeling attempts and then present a model that formalizes the two systems
in terms of computational processes, as well as their roles and dynamic inter-
play in inter-agent communication. Finally, we report results from simulations
of embodied communication between two virtual agents, each of which equipped
with its own model. We analyze how different abilities for mentalizing enable in-
creasingly complex social coordination, from mere mimicry to eventually shared
understanding.
2 Related work
Researchers interested in embodied conversational agents (ECAs) have explored
many ways that enable agents to respond in interactive settings of verbal and
nonverbal communication. The Smart Body animation system [15] enables re-
sponsive combination of behavior animations and has been integrated with an
improved text and speech analysis system, called Cerebella, to better react by
mapping appropriate behavioral responses to derived mental states [7]. The Tha-
lamus framework [10] employs a perceptual loop for continuous interaction with
the environment mediated through the agent’s body. It has been extended to a
generation process shared between “mind” and “body”, modeled as a network
of behavior models that interface with a body representation [11]. Contradicting
with (though referring to) tenets of embodied cognition, this model separates
mind and body dualistically. We do not follow this modularized approach but
strive for a more consequently embodied and situated account, in which cog-
nitive processes ground in or even arise from sensorimotor layers and bodily
shaped interaction with the environment, mediated through perception-action
couplings.
As one of the few modeling attempts to combine mentalizing, perception
and action control in dynamic social interaction, Wolpert et al. [18] underline
in their MOSAIC model that a true communicative model needs to close the
communicative loop and must be perceptive to the observer’s responses and ul-
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timately her understanding. They hypothesize a hierarchy of paired forward and
inverse models as a basic mechanism for processing movement as well as beliefs
or intentions. Sadeghipour and Kopp [12] proposed an Empirical Bayesian Belief
Update model (EBBU), a probabilistic model that implements a mirroring-based
account of the perception and production of gestural behavior. They use a hi-
erarchically organized representation of motor knowledge for action perception
through forward models that formulate probabilistic expectations about possible
continuations of observed gestures. The same representation is used for action
generation, with probabilistic interactions between both processes to explain
priming and resonance effects. Representations are dynamically augmented by
way of inverse models when an unknown action is encountered.
Few attempts have been made to clarify the interaction between mentaliz-
ing and mirroring. A meta-analysis of studies on mentalizing found that mirror
areas are not recruited unless the task involves inferencing intentionality from
action stimuli [17]. Teufel et al. [14] present the “Perceptual Mentalizing Model”
which focuses on the influence of the mentalizing system on the mirror system
via perceptual processing. They differentiate between explicit and implicit ToM
(what we call here mentalizing and mirroring, respectively). Importantly, both
kinds of ToM are assumed to be influenced by social sensory processing. Explicit
ToM processes are associated with processing of intentionality of a movement
and strongly influence perception-action coupling in implicit ToM processing.
Wykowska et al. [19] present a model of social attention, the “Intentional Stance
Model”, in which the mentalizing system either exhibits an intentional stance
towards agents (attributing intentionality) or a design stance towards objects.
The mentalizing system is assumed to influence sensory processing in a top-down
fashion, but also to affect sensory gain control in attention mechanisms. They
report the sensory gain manipulation for attentional reorienting mechanisms to
be stronger in the intentional stance than in the design stance. A key aspect in
triggering this intentional stance seems to be social gaze, which has been found
to lead to the attribution of communicative intent [1], which in turn differen-
tially recruits the mirroring and mentalizing system networks in processing the
behavior of the interlocutor.
3 Towards an integrated model of the social brain
In this paper we present first steps towards a model of how a predictive sen-
sorimotor subsystem and a mentalizing subsystem for attributing mental states
interact during situated communication. We thereby not only devise the model
but also implement and test it in simulation of social (nonverbal) interactions
between two virtual agents, to explore how communicative coordination emerges
from the dynamic interplay between the two systems.
We base our modeling approach on a number of assumptions (see Figure 1):
First, we define successful communication to be a process that requires shared
communicative intentionality and establishes perceptual or conceptual common
ground between the participants [16]. This state is achieved in a dynamic ground-
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Fig. 1. The simulated nonverbal communication between our two virtual agents.
ing process [3], in which communicating agents reciprocally reveal and coordi-
nate their beliefs about each other as well as the state of their interaction.
Second, mentalizing plays a pivotal role by facilitating information integration
and self-other distinction for coordinated action. It affects and receives infor-
mation from the mirroring system, which itself processes perceived action in an
immediate fashion. Third, we assume that coordinated action in communication
highly depends on the degree of ToM realized by the mentalizing system: 2nd
order reasoning, i.e. beliefs about other-beliefs, is minimally necessary for any
cooperative behavior that goes beyond accidental coordination. Finally, gaze
plays a special role in signaling and regulating social attention and is an in-
dicator of communicative intent [1]. Mirror areas were found to be recruited
especially when intentional action is expected [17]. We hence assume that gaze
triggers mentalizing and thus also mirroring activity. Staying within the con-
fines of the nonverbal domain, we also include head-nods and head-shakes as
meta-communicative feedback for signalling agreement or disagreement.
3.1 Mentalizing subsystem
The mentalizing subsystem is a model of an agent’s subjective ToM, which pro-
cesses definite information about itself and infers others’ mental states from
perceptual input. A detailed depiction of the mentalizing subsystem is given in
Figure 2, which we will refer to and describe in more detail in section 3.3. In
its current version, the system utilizes a simple set of inference heuristics to
model how mental state attributions arise and change in social interaction. In
detail, this model consists of three sets of mental state attributes for different
orders of ToM reasoning: Beliefs held about mental states of myself (me) or the
interlocutor (you) constitute what we call ‘1st order ToM’. Further, in pursuit
of a minimal cognitive model of mentalizing, we assume that only one order of
ToM higher is needed for what we want to model. In contrast to the classical
recursively nested beliefs, however, we stipulate these beliefs to be held about
mental states that both interlocutors have in common (we). This is what we call
‘2nd order ToM’. The functional role that we ascribe to 2nd order ToM is to keep
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track of common ground, the desire to agree, and the collaborative state of com-
munication more generally. Generally, mental states consist of beliefs, desires,
and intentions.
3.2 Mirroring subsystem
The mirroring subsystem employs the abovementioned EBBU model [12] for
action observation and production. It implements a probabilistic hierarchical
representation of sensorimotor knowledge about hand gestures, along with basic
prediction, evaluation and activation processes that are used in both perception
and generation of gestures. On the lowest level, motor commands are stored that
represent segmented movements in time and space. Hand trajectories are given
as directed graphs with edges representing motor commands. On the intermedi-
ate level, motor programs represent paths in the motor command graph and thus
stand for meaningful movements. The highest level of abstraction stores motor
schemas that cluster and represent similar motor programs. When observing a
hand trajectory the hierarchical motor knowledge structure is activated and “res-
onates” to the observed gesture. In each time step the model predicts possible
continuations of the observed gesture and compares them to the actual per-
ception. Results lead to updated posterior probability distributions and hence
activation of the corresponding motor commands, programs, or schemas. We
equipped the mirroring subsystem with knowledge of different trajectories for
three iconic (‘circle’, ‘square’, ‘surface’) and one emblematic gesture (‘waving’).
Those were learned from real human motion data. Single motor programs for
a schema can take up to five seconds to produce, with motor commands being
activated every tenth of a second. For every new observation of a hand trajec-
tory entering the system the top-most level posterior distributions over motor
schemas are taken as a proxy for a gesture’s meaning, and are linked to first
order mental state attributes in the mentalizig subsystem.
3.3 Integration and interplay
Our goal is to integrate mentalizing with mirroring-based action perception to
account for how behavior and mental states arise and interact dynamically in
a communicative interaction. As a working hypothesis, we consider both sys-
tems to be separate but with continuous interactions and projections between
each other. In the mentalizing subsystem, any observation of actions can have
a direct influence on the mental states held about you, where desires, beliefs
and intentions are heuristically inferred. For any observed gesture processed by
the mirroring subsystem, the most likely motor schema hypothesis is immedi-
ately projected into the mentalizing subsystem where it forms a mental state
attributed as a you-belief, as long as the intention to communicate can be in-
ferred. Correspondingly, a me-belief would cause the mirroring subsystem to
recruit the intended motor schema for production. The current version of the
mirroring subsystem is only capable of processing hand gestures; gaze and head
movements are thus directly asserted to the mentalizing subsystem.
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Depending on the degree of ToM processed in the agent’s mentalizing module,
communicative intent can trigger an inferred desire to reach mutual agreement
about the understanding of the produced gesture. This is assessed applying a
threshold for good-enough understanding to the likelihood of beliefs about men-
tal states of me and you (1st order ToM). Note, however, when this threshold
is exceeded the producer agent still cannot be certain about the correct under-
standing in the recipient unless sufficient feedback is provided. Here we require
at least one correct reproduction of the gesture. Further, head-shake and head-
nod signals are employed for meta-communication and can either increase or
decrease confidence in the respective you-belief.
4 Simulation results
In order to test the model in online interactions we implemented the model
and ran simulations with two virtual agents, each of which equipped with its
own integrated model. At the start of the simulation, both agents only have a
predefined set of mental states about themselves. They can communicate us-
ing four gestures (‘circle’, ‘square’, ‘surface’, and ‘waving’) that are perceived
and generated as 3D hand trajectories, as well as head nods/shakes that are
transferred as simple timed key-value pairs. Gestures are produced with a con-
figured amount of white noise, normalized to the maximum movement vectors
Gaze
Presentation phase
Acceptance phase
Agreement
R1:
R2:
C1:
C2:
C3:
C4:
C5:
C6:
C7:
C8:
C9:
R3:
R4:
R5:
R6:
R7:
R8:
R9:
R10:
DMC ) IMC
IWC ^ PW ) IMC (Hnod)
IWC ^ ¬PW ) IMC (Hshake) ^ IMC (PM )
IWC ^ PW ) DWA
DMC ^DYC ) IWC
IWC ^ PW ) IMC (Hnod)
IWC ^ PW ) DWA
DMC ^DYC ) IWC
IYC ) DYC
DYC ^ ¬PY ^ PM ) IMC (PM )
DMC ) IMC
IYC ) DYC
We assume that all these variables are probabilities
P = Belief that is to be communicated / Belief about what was perceived
I = Intention about gaze, head-nod, head-shake, the production of a belief or communication
D = Desire about communication (me & you) or agreement (we)
M / Y / W = Mental state attribution to „me“/„you“/„we“
C = Communication
A = Agreement
H = Head signal backchannel (nodding or shaking)
First order Theory of Mind
Second order Theory of Mind
IWC ^ IYC (Hnod)) (PY ) PW )
RecipientCommunicator
IWC ^ PM ^ PY ) PW IWC ^ PM ^ PY ) PW
IWC ^ IYC (Hnod) ^ ¬PY ) IMC (Hshake) IWC ^ IYC (Hshake) ^ IYC (PY )) PM = PY = ;
IWC ^ IYC (Hshake)) IMC (PM )
IWC ^ P 0Y ^ PM ) (PM = PY ) ^ IMC (PM )
Fig. 2. Attributes and inference heuristics in the mentalizing subsystem applied during
different phases of the interaction. The basis for complex inference is “Communicative
Intention”, inferred from social gaze. The “Communicator” agent enters the “Presenta-
tion Phase”, followed by an “Acceptance Phase” of interactive grounding, where higher
order mental attributions are needed for both agents to reach “Agreement”.
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in the motor schema, so that 10% noise reflect only a small amount of devia-
tion during gesturing. The amount of noise, the ability for 2nd order ToM, and
the good-enough threshold for minimal confidence in observing a gesture are
the independent variables to parametrize the simulation. We ran six simulation
setups: 10%/20%/30% noise with enabled or disabled 2nd order ToM capacity,
and a static confidence threshold of 0.8. Each of the setups was run 100 times,
always with identically configured agents. Simulations ended either when both
agents believed to have reached agreement, or without 2nd order ToM, as soon
as the Communicator finished its gesture production. As dependent variables we
collected the probability distribution of the attributed you-belief about a ges-
ture’s meaning after every processing of a hand trajectory. We were particularly
interested in the effects that different degrees of mentalizing have on the inter-
agent coordination dynamics. The complexity of the communication depends
on inferred communicative intent, signaled via social gaze. As soon as mutual
communicative intent is established, the simulation follows a typical grounding
process with presentation and acceptance phases [3], where the Communicator
always starts with producing a ‘circle’ gesture.
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Fig. 3. Example interactions from our simulation when both agents have 1st order ToM
(top) or 2nd order ToM (bottom). Overt behavior is shown along with the triggered
mentalizing inferences (gray circles; indices referring to Figure 2).
To examplify the effect of the mental attributions and inferences possible
in 1st and 2nd order ToM, Figure 3 illustrates two typical interaction patterns
from our simulation study. The overt behavior of two agents, a Communicator
and a Recipient, are shown along with the inferences drawn after perceiving or
producing a certain behavior, with indices referring to the inference rules as
shown in Figure 2. The interaction at the top shows a sequence of behavior
and inferences typical for 1st order ToM mentalizing. The configured desire to
communicate triggers rule C1, hence gaze behavior is perceived by the Recipient
(rule R1 ). Since the Recipient is equally configured, its reciprocal gaze behavior
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(rule R2 ) triggers an inference about the Recipient’s desire to communicate in
the Communicator (rule C2 ), and consequently a gesture is produced(rule C3 ).
The interaction at the bottom shows behavior and inferences enabled through
2nd order ToM. While in the beginning there is a similarity to the 1st order
ToM interaction, additionally rules R3 and C4 are triggered and establish the
agents’ common communicative intent and thus the foundation for meaning-
ful coordination behavior. After the initial gesture production the Recipient’s
mirroring subsystem provides the mentalizing subsystem with the most likely
interpretation for the Communicator’s behavior. That novel behavior triggers
rule R4, by which the Recipient would ideally produce the understood gesture
back to the Communicator, but in this interaction the gesture was understood
with a likelihood above the good-enough threshold. This triggers rule R5 and R9
as well, leading to a head-nod. Since the Communicator has no idea what the
Recipient has understood the head-nod behavior is answered by a head-shake
(rule C7 ), which triggers the Recipient to produce its understood gesture back
to the Communicator (rule R8 ). The Communicator understands the gesture,
which triggers rules equivalent to those in the Recipient (rule C5, C8, and C9 ),
leading to a head-nod, which is equivalently answered by the Recipient (rule R6,
and R9 ) and finalizes the interaction through mutually believed agreement (rule
R10 ).
To test the agents’ ability to coordinate with and without 2nd order ToM
enabled, we analyzed the Kulbach-Leibler Divergence between the probability
distributions of the Recipient’s you-belief and the Communicator’s me-belief,
i.e. the “target belief”. Figure 4(a) shows the divergence over interaction time.
Without 2nd order ToM only one gesture was produced within 5 seconds. With
2nd order ToM the duration was strongly dependend on the correct understand-
ing of observed gestures. The more mistakes, likely due to noise, the more cor-
rection effort emerged and hence longer interactions. Analyzed were interactions
with length of at least 10 seconds and 20 seconds, respectively. These plots show
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Fig. 4. Simulation results show a) KL-divergence between agents’ beliefs during inter-
actions of different extent, averaged over noise and ToM conditions, b) mean differences
between noise conditions, and c) total mean differences between achieved likelihood
about another’s belief between ToM conditions.
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the average success of coordination, especially in longer interactions. To test the
effect of noise we compared the success of both agents reaching the target belief
after 5 seconds, averaged over ToM conditions (Figure 4(b)). The comparison
shows a significant difference (t()=2.4, p<0.05) between 10% (M=0.6, SD=0.4)
and 30% (M=0.7, SD=0.5) noise conditions on gesture understanding. Subse-
quently, we tested the influence of 2nd order ToM, also by analyzing the success
of reaching the target belief (Figure 4(c)). A comparison of the final beliefs av-
eraged over all noise conditions with 2nd order ToM (M=0.9, SD=0.27) and
without (M=0.7, SD=0.45) showed that 2nd order ToM leads to significantly
more likely success in coordination (t=6.8, p<0.01).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented work towards equipping virtual agents with a
cognitively inspired model of a “social brain”. Our approach is based on the
notion that in social interaction, abilities for higher order mentalizing come to
interact with predictive action observations in particular ways, and it is this
interplay that accounts for the dynamic coordination mechanisms responsible
for successful communication. The present step was to implement a ‘minimal’
mentalizing model that enables distinct mental perspectives, corresponding to
beliefs about me, you, and we, and to let it interact with a mirroring-based
EBBU model. Actual simulations of dynamically unfolding interaction were run
to investigate whether higher order mental state attributions can give virtual
agents a distinct advantage in inferring information necessary to successfully act
towards a communicative goal. The results we obtained so far demonstrate that
endowing IVAs with mechanisms found in the “social brain” enables interactive
grounding without scripting it, and thus makes communication significantly more
robust and efficient. However, even with higher order mentalizing capacities, a
too large perturbation of the communicative signals led to long interaction times
due to the inefficient error correcting mechanism emerging from both agents’
goal for successful communication. Still, our first prototypical modeling attempt
established that mentalizing is crucial for meaningful coordination behavior and
success in communication could not be guaranteed without 2nd order ToM. We
see the present framework as a good basis for further investigations how an
understanding of social cognitive processes can help in the endeavour towards
more natural and robust embodied agents, just as the analysis of interactions
of humans with agents equipped with our framework will contribute to testing
our understanding of how the social brain works. As next steps we will include
an account for strategic noise compensation through altered signaling behavior,
and want to pursue the question how self-other distinctions can manifest in the
sensorimotor system during action observations to help in that attempt.
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